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Abstract: Irony appears to be deeply rooted in the practice of ethics. Attempts to prescribe morally obligatory duties, 
and to will morally justified actions, often bring about the opposite of their intended result.  Imposing imperatives, 
e.g., justice, in efforts to produce fair, equitable, caring societies, inadvertently plants seeds of failure. The 
imposition of moral imperatives increasingly appears to generate polarities rather than unities, as cases of abortion, 
euthanasia, reactions to liberal immigration, and environmental protection policies have illustrated. Imposed 
imperatives generate counter imperatives and counterclaims of having justice on “our” side. I attempt here to explain 
this phenomenon and, in the process, argue that attempts to resolve such conflicts by defending one’s position 
against its opposition is, in a certain way, destructive of moral life. I conclude with a sketch of how an ethic of 
attunement can help rectify this problem. 
Bruce Morito is Professor of Philosophy at Athabasca University, Athabasca, Alberta, Canada. His main areas of 
research and writing can generally be described as practical ethics with emphasis on environmental philosophy and 
issues pertaining to Indigenous people/Crown relations. He is especially interested in how matters of worldview 
(metaphysics), value theory, personhood, and mind bear on these topics. 
 
 Irony appears to be deeply rooted in the practice of ethics. Attempts to prescribe morally 
obligatory duties, and to will morally justified actions, often bring about the opposite of their 
intended result. Imposing imperatives, e.g., justice, in efforts to produce fair, equitable, caring 
societies, inadvertently plants seeds of failure. The imposition of moral imperatives increasingly 
appears to generate polarities, rather than unities, as cases of abortion, euthanasia, reactions to 
liberal immigration, and environmental protection policies have illustrated. Imposed imperatives 
generate counter imperatives, and counter-claims of having justice on “our” side. I attempt here 
to understand this phenomenon and, in the process, argue that attempts at resolving such 
conflicts by defending one side over its opposition to others is, in certain ways, destructive of 
moral life. I conclude with a sketch of how a different approach can be formed. 
 The idea that opposites produce one another is traceable in the West to Platonic thought 
in the Phaedo (Plato, 1973:70e ff), to Hegel (1979) and his view of the dialectic between 
opposites, and in the East to Taoism (theory of yin/yang). The dominant traditions in ethics and 
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moral theory, however, have paid little attention to this view of how the world works, resulting, I 
want to argue, in misunderstanding the consequences of imposing imperatives and how this 
results in large-scale moral failure, describable as rebellion (inversion of moral values), reversal 
(turning moral principles against accusers), and hypocrisy. 
 Two kinds of oppositional relations are relevant here. The first involves the opposition 
between ideal and real, an artifactual opposition; the second involves natural opposites. The 
former is constructed whereas the latter is comprised of “givens” or basic facts of life. Failure to 
understand how these oppositions play out, results in a blindness to actual lines of causality that 
operate in motivational systems. To set the stage for understanding how this occurs, a brief 
summary of the history of moral scepticism – the denial that moral commitments to principles of 
justice can be the motivations for action – discloses how such causal connections have come to 
be ignored by moral prescriptivists. Moral scepticism goes back at least to the Thrasymachus-
Socrates exchange, (Plato, Republic, 338c ff) and “The Ring of Gyges” (359a ff), in response to 
which Socrates attempts to show that rational agents can actually act on commitments to justice, 
as such, once they know and understand justice. Socrates refuses to admit that a person can know 
what justice is and not act on it; he refuses to admit the possibility of akrasia or weakness of will 
(Plato, Protagoras, 358d). Failure to act justly must, then, be a matter of ignorance.  
This response seems rather naive today, but even Aristotle (Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. 
VII:1-10) had his doubts, arguing that moral failure is more a problem of opinion interfering with 
the knowledge of justice one has. His explanation admits that other-than-moral ideas and forces 
can interfere with the knowledge one has, which assumes a more complicated and nuanced moral 
psychology than that of Socrates. Later, Hume challenges the underlying belief that reason can 
cause action in and of itself, when he attempts to show that it is a mere slave of the passions. 
 43 
Kant, being awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, dedicated two major works to 
recovering something of the Socratic measure of moral authority and efficacy. Others have 
responded, in turn. Nietzsche (On The Geneology of Morals,1:7 ) for instance, declared that 
ethics is the product of a slave mentality, determined to exact revenge on the powerful. It derives 
from resentiment (1:10), or anger and the need for revenge, not reason.  
In the 20th century, logical positivists regarded ethics (normative pretensions) as 
nonsense, like metaphysics, deeming both to be little more than emotional expression, and 
supported the behaviourist project of eliminating ethics (and practical reason) from explanations 
of human behaviour. Capping off the eliminativist program, B.F. Skinner (Beyond Freedom and 
Dignity) argued that ethics should have no place in the ordering of human relations. Ethics 
should be replaced by stimulus-response mechanical means to engineer behaviour. 
 The history of Western moral thought can be described as a debate over the motivational 
efficacy of ethics and the ontological status of moral agents. It has been, among other things, a 
debate over the lines of causality relevant to the control of action. Over this history, traditional 
prescriptive ethicists have faced a gradual erosion of supposed solid foundations, established by 
a priori reasoning and knowledge. Being ignorant of the actual physical conditions that made 
rational thought possible, moral agency (e.g., causally independent reason, rationally determined 
will, a priori determination of moral concepts, persons as rational repositories of intrinsic value), 
could be conceived as independent of physical conditions. As counter-evidence from 
neurophysiology, psychology and sociology has arisen to support the sceptic, however, these 
foundations have eroded. 
 Consequently, claims and assumptions by prescriptivists that persons can act 
independently of these physical conditions have become increasingly dogmatic. Further, with 
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developments in areas such as artificial intelligence, complexity, emergence and chaos theories, 
alternative explanations of personhood are being formulated, which, in turn, obviate the need to 
make references to radically free wills as determinants of action. The associated belief that our 
moral agency is connected to something like intrinsic value, which justifies treating ourselves as 
somehow independent of the natural, causal order of merely instrumentally valuable beings, must 
also be asserted dogmatically. To the extent that we accept evolutionary and ecological theories 
– the view that everything is the result of long historical processes and exists as a consequence of 
the inter-relatedness of all things – moral theories that assign human moral agents special powers 
(causal status) and value independent of natural processes, are being exposed as constructions, 
whose justifications are losing force. Thus, as prescriptivists continue to assert that persons have 
capacities to know and act on moral imperatives that they do not actually have, we can begin to 
see why imposing moral imperatives engenders reversals, inversions and hypocrisy. 
 To see how the structure of traditional moral thinking produces the opposite of what it 
intends, a critique of Kant’s attempt at a comprehensive and rigorous defence of moral 
prescriptivism helps identify central factors. His is a construction (to him, a discovery) of an 
ideal rational world, operating independently of the world of natural (phenomenal/physical and 
psychological) causes, “the mechanism of nature.” In both the Foundations of the Metaphysics of 
Morals (Kant, 1976) and the Critique of Practical Reason (Kant, 1956), he argues that the 
rational mind can determine moral imperatives independently of the mechanism; hence, practical 
reason can be “pure.” After formulating the categorical imperative, as derived from pure 
practical reason alone, he proceeds to show how moral agency works, or how pure practical 
reason can have a causal effect in the phenomenal realm. Since the separation of pure practical 
reason from the mechanism of nature implies an incommensurability between the intellectual and 
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sensuous or phenomenal, like Plato’s soul/body and Descartes’ mind/body incommensurability, 
Kant encounters the interaction problem. How can fundamentally different realms have any 
connection, especially of a causal nature? For Kant, a one-way causal connection from reason to 
the mechanism of nature exists by way of the will (Wille), which determines action in the 
phenomenal realm. Moral agents, then, not only must, but can override non-moral motivations. 
As rational determiners of the will, persons are causal agents, who not only compel their internal 
mechanisms of nature to conform to the principle of universalizability, but they must and can 
treat themselves and other agents as ends-in-themselves, whose duty is to construct a kingdom of 
ends on the Earth. These duties and values do not admit of compromise with other motivations 
and values (instrumental). 
 Kant, however, admits that we cannot prove that pure practical reason is that which 
determines a particular action. In the Critique of Practical Reason, he recognizes that pure 
practical reason cannot cause anything in the phenomenal realm in and by itself, precisely 
because it is detached from the phenomenal. It requires an intermediary, similarly to how pure 
reason requires an intermediary (the schemata) to connect the categories of pure reason to the 
sensory realm in The Critique of Pure Reason (1929, B177/A138-B178/A139). Kant must show 
how a one-way causal connection is possible between the pure and the phenomenal realms. He 
does this through reference to the typic (1956, 70-74]. As mediator, the typic enables principles 
to be applied through acts of pure will, but no evidence can ever prove that reason causes action 
through an act of pure will to anyone (even to ourselves). This is as it must be, since there can be 
no mechanism connecting the phenomenal to pure reason, and therefore no evidence-based proof 
of a causal connection. As he puts it, the moral law has only to do with the abstract notion of 
freedom, which makes no reference to natural (phenomenal) connections. The typic, then, is only 
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a presentation of the idea of law, in the most general sense, to the senses, not a body of concrete 
evidence demonstrating that reason causes action in and by itself. In the end, how the moral law 
“can be the direct determining ground of the will ... is an insoluble problem for the human 
reason” (1956, 75). Hence, we never know whether it is the categorical imperative, or some 
hypothetical imperative, that determines action. Shocking as this conclusion may be to Kantians, 
it is a logical consequence of Kant’s argument. 
 I have dwelt on Kantian prescriptivism in order to identify the explanatory and 
justificatory gap that persists in pure and ideal world thinking, to make clear why proponents of 
the view must at some point assert that we can in fact act on pure ideal imperatives. The 
interaction problem, which looked more like a puzzle from Socratic or Cartesian perspectives, 
for Kant is an increasingly difficult problem in the face of developing physical and psychological 
theories. His attempt at a systematic and rigorous justification and admission that interaction 
remains an insoluble problem demonstrates why, as the notion of the a priori loses purchase, 
prescriptivists must become increasingly dogmatic about our ability to obey imperatives. 
 What else has supported the prescriptivist’s confidence that persons can follow ideal 
world prescriptions? First, although not universal, this structure of prescriptive moral theorizing 
is ubiquitous. A description of these other expressions helps illustrate what gives confidence in 
prescriptivism. It is connected to absolutist sensibilities, which seem to obviate the need to solve 
the interaction problem. Kant’s was a reference to an absolute ideal of pure reason, much like 
Socrates’ appeal to some pure form of reason sourced in an absolute Good. Hinduism similarly 
holds Brahman to be the Absolute. Brahman assigns human beings duties which. according to 
Krishna (the manifest form of Brahman) in the Bhagavad Gita, (Mascaro, 1962, Chapter 3), 
override and counter the influences of the gunas (desires, passions). Our higher (pure) natures 
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call us to renounce these lower aspects of life (of utilitarian value only), in much the same way 
as Kant (and Socrates) calls us to apply the pure moral law over and against desire and emotion. 
Krishna is describing a pure realm whose dictates cannot admit compromise with lower order 
forces. While not admitting of influence by the lower realms, pure moral forces emanating from 
Brahman can command human beings to act. Krishna appeals to this metaethical framework to 
demonstrate that Arjuna has a duty to fight for his sovereign, to kill other arguably legitimate 
claimants to the throne, even though some of those whom he is obligated to kill are his relatives 
and loved ones. Given that the sovereign gained his seat on the throne through less than virtuous 
means (a broken promise), the only reason Arjuna has for listening to Krishna is the absolute 
authority of Brahman. In the end, Arjuna is not rationally convinced by Krishna but simply 
overwhelmed by the force and sublimity of Brahman. Something like this seems to operate in the 
mind of the prescriptivist: the force of the idea of the moral law is so impressive and formidable, 
because backed by an absolute, that there is no need ultimately to justify that the gap between 
realms can be bridged. 
 In the challenges to Confucianism, similar debates play out, but in a way that helps lead 
the discussion specifically toward the theme of opposites. As in the West, metaethical issues 
concerning personhood and agency are raised in response to Confucian claims that ren can 
override base desires and other lower order motivations, deriving as it does from some higher 
authority (Heaven) (Confucius, 1989, Book II, VII). Albeit not as radical as in Kantian/Hindu 
ethics, persons belong to a different order from that of other creatures and their lower natures. In 
emulating the chun-tzu (gentleman), human beings have the power to override their lower 
desires. While Confucius thought it unnecessary to engage in metaethical justification for this 
claim, his follower, Mencius, did not. Mencius faced Thrasymachus-like challenges by critics 
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like Kao Tzu, who rejected the claim that there are moral motivations that can operate 
independently of desire and (natural) forces (Mencius, 1970, Book 6: 4).  Mencius’ response is 
that ren is not “natural,” in the sense that everyone ordinarily acts on and from it, although it is 
natural, in the sense that we are born with it. The capacity has to be awakened and nurtured. 
Ultimately, the capacity originates in a higher-order, transcendent source, giving us the power 
uncompromisingly to override earthly forces, without, in turn, being subject to Earth’s forces. 
Again, ultimately, it appears that belief in some absolute, transcendent authority is that which 
grounds confidence in our ability to override lower orders. 
 Confucius, however, despaired over finding a genuine chun-tzu (1989, Book IV: 6). He 
despaired, because people everywhere failed in their responsibilities; everywhere the opposite of 
our Heaven-mandated behaviour was compromised and violated. As a result, he felt more at 
home with the barbarians, defined as those without a true understanding of the moral law, than 
with his so-called civilization. A life informed by Heaven-defined jen (goodness), it turns out, is 
not consistent with living in the real world. We can ask, how then can the real barbaric world 
display more of what Heaven demands than the cultured world that is allegedly informed by 
Heaven? If something about societies not organized around ideal world constructions can be 
more genuinely moral, Confucius seems to be blind to the problem of interaction his explanatory 
system creates. 
 Taoists, in contrast, do not seem blind to this problem and the relationship between 
opposites, noting how the production of an opposite can be anticipated, implying that Confucians 
should be aware of the problem. Taoists take the world, including the moral world, to be a play 
of opposites, capturing the notion in the theory of yin/yang. The world is constituted of 
opposites, where life and death, dark and light, good and bad, right and wrong, usefulness and 
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uselessness, are in constant dynamic relation, such that attempts to eliminate one side of the 
equation results in imbalance, in dysfunction, futility. Moral principles cannot be absolute from 
this perspective. The Tao may be considered an absolute, but when we somehow reside in it, we 
do not override, renounce, or command desire and emotion. My approach to oppositional 
relations is, in part, inspired by Taoism, because it helps highlight how thinking in terms of 
moral imperatives as absolutes creates a kind of blindness to problems generated by the theory. 
However, I will not appeal to it to make my case but rather look to empirical evidence and 
contemporary theories. 
Natural Opposites 
 As Taoism anticipates, evolutionary and ecological theories describe the world in terms 
of a play of opposites (see Levins and Lewontin, 1985). In ecosystems, construction/destruction, 
affirmation/negation, prey/predator, host/parasite relations are constitutive. For organisms to 
live, there must be destruction of other life and non-living forms. The structure of sources of 
nutrition must be broken down in order to be utilized by the organism for its own growth and 
survival. Evolution involves the emergence of new forms and species, which, because of 
competition, involves the extinction of others. At more fundamental levels, it involves the 
destruction of entire systems (e.g., of stars to form elements like iron). 
 Curiously, the once deemed “natural” opposition between reason and emotion is being 
exposed as false. At neuronal levels, cognitive areas of the brain that enable reasoning are 
connected to limbic systems (responsible for emotions, contributing to learning and the ability to 
appreciate consequences) (Norden, 2007, Lecture 21, and Purves et al., 2001), indicating that 
reasoning does not take place without some emotive component, at least with respect to decision 
and action. As we discover how inter-connected structures and functions of the brain are, the 
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reason vs. emotion opposition is exposed as artifactual. This has implications for how we analyze 
lines of causality between thought and action. The straightforward relation between reason, 
determination of principle, determination of will (in overriding emotion) and action cannot, 
therefore, be the structure through which reasoning operates. Actual lines of causality must be 
more complex and non-linear than that. Where ideal world prescriptions and imperatives assume 
such linearity, they also, in principle, demand that agents act in ways in which they are incapable 
(e.g., without regard for emotion). Moral failure figures into the equation, then, at fundamental 
levels, because of a failure to understand just what constitutes an oppositional relation. 
 To the extent that we ignore natural oppositions and create false ones, lines of ethical 
justification also become suspect. For instance, the idea that to have property x (e.g., intrinsic 
value) justifies assigning the bearer of those properties an inherent right to life has become 
fundamental to much ideal-world prescriptive ethics. However, it is not recognized by 
ecosystems, evolution, or even a person’s own biology. To assert this kind of property, then, is to 
fly in the face of counter-evidence. The related idea that we must respect the non-negotiable 
status (absoluteness) of those to whom inherent right is ascribed, fails to take the complexity of 
human life into account, as is evidenced by the fact that we must sometimes decide to place 
people (soldiers and police officers) in situations where we know some will be killed. If the 
context in which bearers of value of any kind evolves is complex, and is constituted by 
oppositional relations, then the properties (including valuational ones) relevant to establishing 
moral standing cannot be separated from natural properties. Hence, to act as if we can stand apart 
from these properties and linearly determine what we ought to do courts failure in much the way 
that caused Confucius to despair. 
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 Failure to recognize natural opposites results in processes like those that led to the Trump 
electoral victory of 2016 in the U.S.A. Donald Trump exploited and, as of this writing, continues 
to exploit, the anger and disenchantment of his follows by blaming environmental protectionists 
and supporters of liberal immigration policies for their loss of jobs, their decline in prosperity, 
for corruption in the federal capital, and for removing America from the world pedestal of 
“greatness”. He has accused the champions of social and environmental justice of injustice, in 
effect reversing the meaning of justice in response to the imposition (as he sees it) of policies and 
laws that operate as imperatives to protect immigrants and the environment. By articulating his 
position as one of righting the wrongs perpetrated on the workers of America, he has 
appropriated the language of justice, inverted its meaning, and turned it against so-called 
progressives. To appreciate the impact of such a reversal on the moral lives of U.S. citizens (and 
the world), moral psychology becomes critical to ethics. When principles (of justice, for 
instance) are imposed, some groups are disadvantaged. Feelings of resentment, anger, and the 
need for revenge are generated because of feeling morally and politically violated, economically 
disadvantaged, and culturally insulted. Those who feel violated are motivated to do and produce 
the opposite of what the imposed measures of justice intend. Of course, this psychological turn 
plays out in more than matters of immigration and environmental protection. We see it being 
played out in the pro-life versus anti-abortionists conflict, liberals and conservatives, et cetera. 
The more absolutist one side gets, the more the other side attempts to reverse the effects of the 
imposition. 
 At another level, Nancy Ann Davis (1990) has argued that ideal world constructions and 
related prescriptions systematically lead to hypocrisy. Since moral justifications for action are 
detached from explanations of how people are actually motivated to act, there is no logical, and 
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therefore, no coherent articulation of the connection between ideal world prescriptions and real 
world mechanisms of action. Since ideal world prescriptions are not based on real world 
motivations, people must pretend to act on them, while acting for other reasons; hence, the 
hypocrisy. By implication, their actions are motivated by other forces, such as fear of sanction, 
or anticipation of reward. Those who claim to act because of moral principle must, then, 
construct cover stories to suppress and hide their actual motivations from themselves and others. 
Unlike Kant, who could rely on the once powerful references to pure reason as his cover story, 
today’s prescriptivists must increasingly rely on different means (e.g., dogmatic assertion), since 
the metaethical eroding effects of physicalism have been so effective. The systematic and 
hypocrisy Davis describes is more than ever becoming tolerated, similarly to how Harry 
Frankfurt describes bullshit (Frankfurt, 2005). The distance between what we avow as reasons 
for action and what are the actual reasons for action seems to be growing to such an extent that 
members of Western society, at least, are having to adapt to the exigencies of life by, not only 
tolerating, but by being hypocritical and using bullshit strategically.   
What Then? 
 Does this imply that ethics can be trivialized and eliminated? I think not. For present 
purposes, I must assume that alternative explanations for ethics and personhood can be given, not 
explained away, even when we accept physicalism in its contemporary articulation. Explaining 
today’s physicalism, however, is too complex a task for the space allotted. But I do want to claim 
that it sheds new light on ethics and moral life as emergent functions, arising from the complex 
structure and function of brains and evolving social relations (those dependent on language use). 
 Given the above, in order for ethics not to be self-defeating, moral thought cannot 
separate the theoretical from the practical, as if metaethical considerations are not important to 
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the practice of ethics. As explanations for what we call “person” and “agency” come under 
review, moral psychology (moral causality) becomes increasingly important to the practice of 
ethics, in determining what we can do, under what conditions we can do it, why we do what we 
do, and why we formulate ideas concerning what we ought to do. In the history of the West, and 
to a large extent the East, ethics has enjoyed a general agreement over what these concepts mean 
(ethics as duty, persons as more closely related to the divine than the Earth), largely it seems, 
because of generally accepted appeals to absolutes and the impressiveness of such appeals on 
people’s psyches. This has helped establish a relatively stable set of metaethical concepts 
grounding assertions about moral values and imperatives. Metaethical reflection on the nature of 
personhood, agency, the good, ultimate foundations of justice, and the like, could then be 
relegated to the more ethereal theoretical activity of scholars, whose conclusions were thought 
not to bear immediately on practice. 
 But if my argument is sound, and the dominant way of thinking ethically itself leads to 
moral failure, re-thinking metaethical foundations and thereby thinking differently ethically (in 
non-absolutist, non-linear ways) are among the most important practical matters today. Indeed, 
the very polarizing issues of abortion and euthanasia, as well as assisted suicide, underline the 
need to re-think, since the resulting entrenchment of positions is leading advocates from both 
sides of these debates to adopt evermore irrational and manipulative techniques (e.g., 
demonizing the opponents, misrepresenting opponents’ positions) to advance their own 
positions. Erosion of communicative activity aimed at establishing mutual understanding, 
agreement and unity is threatening to undermine our abilities to build robust moral communities. 
 To stand with those who maintain a focus on developing and sustaining robust moral 
communities is to refocus on the task of attuning ourselves to the actual conditions that give rise 
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to and support moral life, and to commit to developing mutual understanding of motivations and 
values among interlocutors. Much of the task is empirical in nature, where we seek to understand 
the physical and psychological conditions upon which moral life develops (evolves). 
Communicative activity between interlocutors concerning interpretation and assigning of 
meaning to actions, relationships, and the like becomes necessary to the building of protective, 
reliable, caring communities. Communities protective of the goods of human life, then, need also 
to become attuned to the conditions of flourishing. Such processes, I would argue, would likely 
result in the three historically persistent ethical positions – utilitarianism, deontology and virtue 
ethics – retaining their position at centre-stage of moral life, however incompatible they can 
seem at times. What we find is that taking the approach just described results in interlocutors 
valuing trustworthiness and reciprocity. Related expectations and senses of obligation arise to 
help ensure that these values are recognized and exercised. But they also result from utilitarian 
concerns, as interlocutors seek ways to guarantee the satisfaction of their values (interests). Of 
course, the story is far more complex than I can present here, but this brief description indicates 
how core elements of moral life could be identified, because they naturally arise among 
interlocutors who find it useful to form communal life. Much more could be said, but at this 
point it is sufficient to note that re-thinking ethics without traditional concepts and references to 
absolutes is both possible and necessary. 
 For this paper, I only want to emphasize the importance of understanding and mutual 
understanding in the development and protection of moral communities. Misunderstandings of 
personhood, as when based on ideal world constructions, must be replaced by more explanatorily 
intelligible and normatively non-absolute conceptions, in order to avoid the divisiveness current 
conceptualizations engender. However, as we learn how persons are emergent functions of self-
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organizing systems (organisms), self-referring and evaluating systems, we are also learning that 
they are perhaps more difficult to explain than traditional theories dreamt them to be. So, no 
simple replacements for traditional conceptions can be expected. But we can retain certain 
Kantian notions, such as that of the person as the unity of experience over time and of the unity 
of multiple functions (perception, understanding, reflection, action). We need to be able to 
explain and give meaning to this unity condition in new ways (not as autonomous self-legislator 
and repository of intrinsic value). While avoiding the interaction problem, a new problem, that of 
emergence, must now be addressed. How does a unity of experience over time that self-identifies 
come to be? Do concepts such as autonomy, freedom, and will still have their place in a 
“naturalized” ethic? If so, how are they to be formulated? Although these are questions for later 
discussion, we can say that each is also a topic for moral deliberation, where we may need to 
negotiate definitions as we continue to learn about the conditions that give rise to the use of these 
concepts. 
 Many traditionally core moral concepts will likely remain core, precisely because we can 
see how interlocutors who have a mutual interest in building and sustaining moral communities 
would develop such concepts. The concept of agency, while understood differently, would 
remain core as a focal point for assigning responsibility and trusting the locus of responsibility to 
act with integrity; likewise with conceptions of freedom and moral decision-making. Once we 
acknowledge that persons emerge in complex and inter-related systems, however, traditional 
essentialist definitions become inadequate and perverse. Replacing essentialist definitions of core 
concepts with relational definitions requires acceptance of some degree of experimentation in 
and negotiating definitions.  
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 On the matter of mutual understanding, as we find that values, e.g., those related to 
aggression and violence, may be intimately related to moral values; because of the play of 
opposites, understanding one another becomes ever more central to moral life. If we find that the 
opposite kinds of motivations are embedded in human psychology and sociology, we need first 
to understand how even those generative of aggression and violence operate in us, not simply 
proscribe them. Then, understanding their potential for re-valuation, for being controlled and 
transformed becomes a central operation of moral life. This would be more in line with what we 
actually do. Those things which gives rise to violence (anger, hatred, fear, aggression, desire to 
dominate) are now often accepted as given motivations, which can, however, be transformed by 
communities by appropriating the right to their expression from individuals and giving that right 
over to cultural systems (e.g., as in “violent” sports), to political systems (e.g., in democracies 
recognizing the need for oppositional parties), and to legal systems (e.g., by requiring 
prosecutions and defence council).  
Similar acts of appropriation are accomplished in various martial arts, which define the 
appropriate form that those motivations are allowed to take. They do so by creating disciplines 
and re-framing the values associated with violence (e.g., by valuing violence in defence of the 
innocent and vulnerable as honourable). By re-framing violence and transforming its expression 
in accordance with conceptions of right contexts, right manners and the like, it is transformed 
into something socially valuable and productive. Plato (Republic 1973, Book II, 375 ff ) 
understood this as a measure that needed to be adopted in the training of the guardians, whose 
high-spiritedness had to be disciplined through gymnastics and music (without which guardians 
would tend to become savage). Indeed, Plato (or Socrates), perhaps ironically, demonstrates how 
we need to become attuned to the actual forces that operate in life, in order to build moral 
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communities. Through transformative processes, the high-spirited individual can be taught to be 
gentle toward citizens of the state yet vicious toward its enemies. In keeping with commitment to 
evidence-based propositions, Plaot uses the pedigree dog (375e) as a real-world proof that such a 
union of opposites is possible. In many ways, the alternative ethic I am proposing already 
operates today and in Confucius’ barbarians. 
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